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The Sergeant John R. Rice Incident
and the Paradox of Indian Civil Rights
THOMAS A. BRITTEN AND LARRY W. BURT
ON A WARM HUMID MORNING in late August 1951, Evelyn
Rice, her three young children, and dozens of other Rice family
members and friends gathered at Memorial Park Cemetery on
the southeast side of Sioux City, Iowa. The occasion was to pay
last respects to Evelyn's husband, John R. Rice, a decorated army
soldier who had been killed in action while serving in the Korean
War. Following a Catholic graveside service, members of two
American Legion posts conducted a brief military ceremony.
After the playing of taps, the grieving family returned home to
nearby Winnebago, Nebraska, exhausted but relieved that their
loved one had finally been laid to rest. Unbeknownst to them as
they drove the 25-mile stretch southwest to Winnebago, events
were unfolding back at the cemetery that would reignite their
grief, stun the surrounding region, and provoke anger and dis-
belief across the country. The events even caught the attention
of President Harry S. Truman and prompted his direct interven-
tion on behalf of Üie Rice family.
When placed within the broader context of post-World War H
America, the John Rice incident sheds light on important issues
that Americans confronted during the Truman presidency. Two
key concerns were the Cold War and the burgeoning civil rights
movement, seemingly disparate matters that overlapped and
influenced each other as the United States struggled to expand
its democratic ideals at home and abroad. The John Rice incident
also indicates an important juncture in the post-World War 11
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American Indian civil rights movement, demonstrating how the
campaign for Indian civil rights got caught up in the sweep of
the much broader civil rights movement of the 1950s. Most non-
Indians in the 1940s and 1950s mistakenly perceived Indians as
seeking the same goals of wirming full rights of U.S. citizenship
that other minorities fought for.
Comparisons of Indian civil rights to those of African Amer-
icans had become commonplace in the years after World War II,
making it easy to overlook the differences between Indians and
other racial minorities. Moreover, for decades Indian issues had
received scant national attention and had been pushed further
and further into the background as the United States became a
superpower with complicated interests all around the globe.
Orily later did many come to understand that civil rights some-
times meant different things to different people. For Indians,
tribal rights based on separate sovereignty were just as impor-
tant as individual rights.
JOHN R. RICE (Walking in Blue Sky) was an American In-
dian, a member of the Winnebago (Ho Churik) Nation of north-
eastern Nebraska. Bom on April 25,1914, and raised in the tiny
town of Thurston on the southwestern edge of the Winnebago
reservation. Rice lived in a time and place in which being In-
dian limited options and opportunities in life. There was little to
encourage a strong identification with an Indian heritage. While
growing up, he attended off-reservation boarding schools that
pulled him far away from the reservation and the Indian com-
munity. As a young man during the early years of the Great De-
pression, the only employment to be found around the reserva-
tion was intermittent farna labor. John Rice thus had little expe-
rience with traditional Ho Chui\k life, and he never felt a part of
the reservation community.'
On December 26, 1941, the 26-year-old Rice enlisted in the
army, just weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It
was a dangerous time to be in uniform. The armies of Nazi
Germany were establishing their dominance in Europe while
1. Pam Rice Goodwin (daughter of Sgt. John R. Rice), telephone interview with
Larry W.Burt, 9/20/2000.
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their Axis ally, Japan, was seeking to do the same in China and
Southeast Asia. like many of the approximately 25,000 Ameri-
can Indians who served in the military during World War H,
Rice was introduced to a very different world. The anny gave
him a steady income and an escape from a life that afforded him
little opportunity. Early in 1942, Rice headed west into the Pa-
cific theater. For the next three-and-a-half years, he saw duty in
New Guinea and the Philippines while serving with the famed
Thirty-second Infantry ("Red Arrow") Division.
Following his discharge from the army in October 1945, Rice
returned briefly to civilian life to recuperate both mentally and
physically from the rigors of war. Periodically he worked con-
struction jobs, trying to make a living for himself and his new
bride, EveIjTi, a local farmer's daughter and a Caucasian he had
married while home on furlough in February 1945. Happy to be
out of the army but frustrated again by a lack of economic op-
portunities on the reservation. Rice reerüisted in January 1946.
For the next few years he fulfilled his military obligation in the
peacetime army at Fort Carson, Colorado, in Korea, and at Fort
Sheridan, Illinois. For a while he served as a member of an army
escort unit that accompanied the bodies of war dead being re-
turned stateside for burial.^
After North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950,
President Truman ordered U.S. troops to respond. The ensuing
three months pitted American soldiers, fighting alongside their
United Nations allies, against a determined North Korean ad-
versary. In late August John Rice, now a first sergeant serving
with Company A, Eighth Regiment, First Cavalry Division,
arrived in Korea. The military situation appeared desperate.
American-led forces dung tenuously to the "Pusan perimeter"
in the southeast comer of the peninsula; another major North
Korean offensive might force unification of the two Koreas. On
2. Ibid; "Soldier's Burial," Time, 9/10/1951, 26; "Sergeant Rice, U.S.A.,"
New York Times, 9/2/1951, sec. 4; Arlington National Cemetery, "John R.
Rice," www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jrrice.htm; William L. Hewitt, "The Indian
Who Never Got Home," Nebraska History 77 (1996), 12-13. Rice's postwar
plight of little opportunity and few good choices was all too common among
Indian veterans. See Kermeth William Townsend, World War ¡I and the Ameri-
can Indian (Albuquerque, NM, 2000), 215-18.
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Sergeant John R. Rice (1914-1950).
Courtesy Sioux City PubUc Museum.
September 6, as the First Cavalry fought to slow the North Ko-
rean advance, 37-year-old John Rice was killed in action while
leading a squad of riflemen in a desperate effort to hold the
Naktong River bridgehead a few miles north of the village of
Taegu (Tabu-Dong). He was one of 307 Nebraska servicemen
killed during the conflict.^
The army took nearly a year to arrange for the trarisport
home of Rice's body.* Shortly before the deceased arrived state-
3. 'Truman Sets Arlington Internment for Indian Denied 'White' Burial," New
York Times, 8/30/1951; "Indian Hero Is Buried in Arlington Ceremony after
Being Refused Internment in Sioux City," New York Times, 9/6/1951; John R.
Rice Casualty File, RG 407; Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Korean
War Casualty File, 2/13/1950-12/31/1953, National Archives, Washington, DC.
507 Iowaiis were killed in the Korean War. See www.archives.gov/research^
room/research_topics /korean_war_casualty_lists /ia_by_town. html.
4. This was not unusual. Thousands of men killed during World War II and the
Korean Conflict were buried in temporary cemeteries near the battlefield until
the war was over or recovery of remains was more easily accomplished. During
the Korean Conflict, helicopters were used for the first time to retrieve the dead
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side, military officials notified Evelyn Rice that she needed to
make final arrangements for her husband. In mid-August 1951,
therefore, Evelyn and her sister Thelma (who was married to
Henry Rice—^John's older brother) drove to Sioux City, where
they met with Ben Willey, sales manager for Memorial Park
Cemetery, a private facility with "beautiful, well-cared for
grounds." They discussed a graveside service, and Evelyn Rice
signed the necessary paperwork to purchase three lots. She
failed to notice a clause in the contract that restricted burial in
Memorial Park to "members of the Caucasian race." Ben Willey,
mearwvhile, did not realize that the deceased was an Indian
(even though he knew that the Rice family lived on the Winne-
bago reservation), and he did not think to verbally inform her of
the restriction. It was not until afler the August 28 funeral service
that both Evelyn Rice and cemetery officials discovered their
"mistake."'
As the mourners filed out of the cemetery following the
graveside service, Wiliey, in a conversation with funeral home
director Dalton T. Boyd, commented that he had been surprised
to see so many Indians at the burial ceremony. Ten of the twelve
honor guardsmen from the American Legion post in attendance
at the funeral, for example, had been American Indians. Boyd
replied by asking, didn't Willey know that John Rice was a Win-
nebago Indian? Shocked, Willey quickly related the news to J. M.
Gunnell, the secretary-treasurer of Memorial Park. Gunnell, in
tum, called a halt to the burial and ordered that Sergeant Rice's
body, which had rested above the open grave for nearly five
hours, be returned to Barber-Boyd Funeral Home in South Sioux
City, Nebraska. Funeral home officials then drove out to Winne-
bago to deliver the unwelcome news that the Rice family would
need to make new arrangements for John.*
so they could be shipped home more quickly. See Dan Baum, 'Two Soldiers:
How the Dead Come Home," New Yorker, 8/9 and 8/16/2004, 79-80.
5. "The Truth about the Sergeant Rice Incident," pamphlet produced by Me-
morial Park Cemetery, Official File, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman
Presidential Library, Independence, MO; Hewitt, "TTie Indian Who Never Got
Home," 13.
6. 'The Truth about the Sergeant Rice Incident"; Sioux City journal, 8/29 and
8/30/1951; Harry Ross, "The Indian Who Never Got Home," UAW Fair Prac-
tices and Anti-Discrimination Department, 1/4/1952,5-7.
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Over the course of the next 24 hours, what had started out
as the simple burial of an American war hero escalated into a
national incident. When cemetery officials halted the burial.
Master Sergeant John C. Boles, a member of the Army Unit Es-
cort Service that had accompanied Rice's body home from the
war, phoned his superiors in Oakland, Califomia. They, in turn,
brought the matter to the attention of the Army Quartermaster
Corps in Washington, D.C. Army officials in the nation's capital
responded by offering to transport Sergeant Rice's remains to
the national cemetery of Evelyn Rice's choice. She selected near-
by Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the army arranged to have
the casket picked up on the morning of August 30.^
Word of the incident spread quickly. Neil McCluen, who had
commanded the American Legion Honor Guard present at the
burial, notified the Sioux City Joumal, which ran an account of the
incident and sent it out over the wire service. Sioux City veterans
groups, labor organizations, and state politicians responded to
the story by issuing strong condemnations of Memorial Park's
burial policies. Laurens C. Shull of Sioux City's Veterans of For-
eign Wars (VFW) Post 580 telegrammed VFW state headquarters
in Des Moines, requesting it to take legal action against the ceme-
tery, while Sioux City's American Legion Post 64 offered to pay
for a burial lot in the city-owned Logan Park cemetery. Voicing
the anger and embarrassment of many of his constituents. Re-
publican Congressman Charles B. Hoeven of nearby Alton, Iowa,
responded to a radio commentator's query as to whether all of
Sioux City's people bore racial prejudices. Hoping to restore the
city's good name, Hoeven argued that the citizens of western
Iowa were "considerate folks and good Americans. Our intention
always is to afford proper and honorable burial to every veteran
regardless of race, creed, or color."*
Many of the local protests came from labor organizations.
The Sioux City metropolitan council of the United Packing-
house Workers (representing Sioux City's largest industry)
7. Major General Harry H. Vaughn, military aide to the president, to Major
General Herman Feldman, Quartermaster General, 9/11/1951; Memorandum
for Major General Vaughn, 8/31/1951; Feldman to Vaughn, 8/31/1951, all in
folder 471-B, Soldiers' Bodies, Sgt. John R. Rice, Official Fue, Truman Papers.
8. Sioux City Joumal, 8/30 and 8/31/1951.
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adopted a resolution urging action to prohibit Memorial Park
from displaying the American flag on "such an un-American
piece of land," while officers of the Sioux City Trades and Labor
Assembly condemned Memorial Park's burial policy as "un-
American and contrary to the democratic principles of this great
nation." A committee of Sioux City public school teachers de-
clared its opposition to the cemetery's racial bigotry and de-
manded the abolition of its "obnoxious and discriminatory"
burial clause. Local American Federation of Labor president
Donald Thompson commented that "if we are willing to accept
the services of a citizen in defense of democracy on a w^orld-
wide level and if he is ready to make the supreme sacrifice, we
should be willing to let him join us in a last resting place regard-
less of race, creed, color, or ancestry." In a show of solidarity
among radal minority groups, David Singer, the state director
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, called the incident "a slap in the face for our statesmen
who are trying to sell democracy to the world. Can you picture
the grin on Stalin's face as he reads the headlines in the Ameri-
can newspapers?"^
Within days, newspapers and magazines from around the
country carried accounts of the story—the vast majority express-
ing outrage at the way a decorated soldier had been treated.
Organizations ranging from the Association of American Indian
Affairs and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) to the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) issued written pro-
tests and adopted resolutions demanding that Memorial Park
officials reconsider and reverse their decision. Oliver LaFarge,
a spokesman for the Association on American Indian Affairs,
summed up his organization's assessment of the incident as fol-
lows: "This is horrible. The manifestation of such an inhuman
and anti-American attitude brings disgrace upon our country."
Cards, letters, and phone calls from well-wishers around the
country, meanwhile, indicated broad support and sympathy for
the Rice family. On August 30, for example. Dr. Maurice Gersh-
man and Lillian Margulies, officials connected with B'nai B'rith,
9. Ibid.; Hewitt, "The Indian Who Never Got Home," 14.
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the New York-based Jewish fraternal organization, sent two
savings bonds for the Rice children with Öie hope "that others
will do the same." The same day, members of the Vermont-
based Barre Guild and Artisans in Stone offered to create and
erect a granite memorial to Sergeant Rice.'"
Under mounting pressure from local businessmen and citi-
zens of Sioux City, as well as from citizens and organizations
from across the country, local officials maneuvered to diffuse
the firestorm as quickly as possible. In the afternoon of August
29, 1951, Clem Evans, who was serving as acting Sioux City
mayor while Mayor Dan J. Conley was vacationing, met with
several dvic and political leaders, including William A. Shumin-
sky, commander-elect of Sioux City's Monahan American Le-
gion Post, Sioux City Solicitor George Davis, Sioux City corpo-
rate counsel M. E. Rowlings, Memorial Park's J. M. Gunnell,
and several prominent Sioux City businessmen. After the meet-
ing, Evans announced that Memorial Park would send letters to
all of its plot owners and stockowners, urging them to support
removal of the clause. Evans added that he would deliver an
apology to the widow. The next day the city council passed a
resolution expressing regret and offering any burial lot in city
cemeteries for free."
Memorial Park officials launched their own efforts at damage
control. After notif5àng Evelyn Rice of their decision not to bury
her husband^ cemetery officials offered to refund her money.
When she refused to accept their offer, they suggested that if she
—or Lieutenant Edward R. Krischel, the army bugler assigned
to the burial detail—were willing to sign an affidavit certifying
that Sergeant Rice was Caucasian, they would go ahead and bury
him. Again she refused. Of paramount concern to cemetery offi-
10. Sioux City loumal, 8/31/1951; Sioux City History, Notable People, Sergeant
John R. Rice, wv/w.siouxcityhistory.org/people/more.php?id=3_0_2_0_M;
"Taps for an Indian," Neivsweek, 9/10/1951, 25; "Soldier's Burial," Time, 9/10
1951, 26; Memorandum for General Harry H. Vaugbn regarding savings bonds
from Gershman and Margulies, 9/10/1951, Official File, Truman Papers; Tele-
gram to President Harry S. Truman from the Barre Guüd and Artisans in Stone,
8/30/1951, ibid.; William Heruy Deacy, executive director, American Institute
of Commemorative Art, to Harry S. Truman, 9/12/1951, ibid.; Major General
Harry H. Vaughn to William Henry Deacy, ibid.
11. "The Truth about the Sergeant Rice Incident."
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ciáis was their fear that allowing Johr\ Rice's burial at the ceme-
tery could lead customers who had agreed to purchase lots in
Memorial Park or who already had loved ones buried in the
cemetery to sue for breach of contract'^
In the nation's capital, meanwhile, word of the incident
reached the White House. On the morning of August 29, Major
General Harry H. Vaughn, one of Truman's aides, brought the
incident to the president's attention. How Vaughn found out
about it is unclear, but it is possible that the Quartermaster
Corps had alerted him the previous evening. President Truman,
in characteristic "Truman style," directed Vaughn to take im-
mediate action to correct the matter. The general responded by
dashing off telegrams to Clem Evans, the acting mayor of Sioux
City, and to Evelyn Rice, informing them that Truman believed
that "national appreciation of patriotic sacrifice should not be
limited by race, color, or creed." The president, he said, was
willing to issue an executive order to have Sergeant Rice buried
in Arlington National Cemetery if the family desired. Although
plans were already under way to inter Rice's remains at Fort
Leavenworth, Evelyn Rice—aware that burial at Arlington
would be a greater honor for her husband—decided to take the
president up on his offer."
Truman's action proved popular across the country. White
House mail heavily supported his decision, and several Sioux
City area radio stations broadcast sympathetic editorials.'* Tru-
man received a warm letter from Mary McLeod Bethune, former
head of the Division of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Ad-
mirustration and special assistant to the secretary of war during
12. Sioux City Journal, 8/29/1951; Ross, "The Indian Who Never Got Home," 7.
13. Major General Harry H. Vaughn to Major General Feldman, 9/11/1951,
Official File, Truman Papers; Memorandum for Major General Vaughn,
8/31/1951, ibid.; Telegram from Major General Harry Vaughn to the Mayor of
Sioux City, 8/29/1951, ibid.; Telegram from Major General Vaughn to Evelyn
luce, 8/29/1951, ibid.; Telegram from Clem A. Evans, Acting Mayor of Sioux
City to Major General Harry H. Vaughn, 8/30/1951. Truman's executive order
was designed to expedite the burial and relieve the family of the bureaucratic
burden of filing applications, etc. Sergeant Rice was entitled to be buried in
Arlington National Cemetery by virtue of his service.
14. Sioux City Journal, 8/30/1951; Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten,
Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence,
KS, 1973), 296.
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World War H. "We bless you for your stand for American justice
and recognition, in the burial of Sergeant Rice," she wrote. "I
just want to thank you for your courage, and for your heart's
imderstanding of what is right and kind and appropriate. . . .
Your stock with the masses has definitely gone up," she com-
mented. "We are standing close beside you for 1952."'^
What followed was an unprecedented, high-profile com-
munity expression of honor and respect. On the morning of
Sunday, September 2, 1951, almost a week after the incident at
Memorial Park, Sergeant Rice's family and friends again set out
to lay his body to rest. Military and public officials, as well as
veterans organizations, scrambled to be a part of something that
promised to rekindle the passion and patriotism of the World
War n era. Master Sergeant John C. Boles, five officers from the
army's Nebraska District, and General Guy N. Henninger, com-
mander of the Nebraska National Guard, representing Nebraska
Govemor Val Peterson, all escorted Sergeant Rice's body from
Winnebago to South Sioux City, Nebraska. American Legion
members selected from Alvin Londrosh Post 174 and Lameré
Greencrow Post 363, both of V\%mebago, went ahead and waited
on the Iowa side of the bridge in Sioux City that lir\ked the state
with Nebraska. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., the funeral procession
arrived in Sioux City. A police escort of four motorcycles and
one squad car contairüng various commurüty leaders as well as
the 20-man escort of Legionnaires accompanied the mourners
on a solemn drive to the Milwaukee Road train station, where
an additional 1,000 people had gathered to pay tribute to Ser-
geant Rice. Once at Ü\e train station, the flag-draped casket was
borne through two ranks of the escort, which stood with arms
presented. Rev. Daniel Madlan, pastor of St. Augustine Catholic
Church at Winnebago, said a brief prayer, and pallbearers placed
the body aboard the train for transport to Washington, D.C. Ac-
companying the body east were John Rice's mother, sister, and
two military escorts. Evelyn Rice and other family members
flew to Washington, D.C, via military aircraft two days later. '"
15. Mary McLeod Bethune to Hany S. Truman, 9/8/1951, Official File, Truman
Papers.
16. Sioux City Joumal, 9/2/1951,9/3/1951.
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On the morning of September 5,1951, a black caisson drawn
by six gray horses bore Sergeant Rice's body, encased in a flag-
covered coffin, from the chapel at Fort Myer, Virginia, to the
gravesite in section 34 of Arlington National Cemetery (itself
segregated until 1947). The site of the burial was but a short dis-
tance from the graves of General John }. Pershing, commander
of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I (and a
longtime admirer of Indian soldiers), and General Walton Walker,
former commander of the Eighth Army in Korea. Present at the
ceremony were numerous dignitaries, including Senators Guy M.
Gillette (D) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R) of Iowa, Senator
Hugh Butler (R) of Nebraska, Secretary of the Interior Oscar L.
Chapman, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer.
Major Charles B. Palmer (Sergeant Rice's former commander in
Korea) was also in attendance. After a brief prayer service per-
formed by Fort Myer chaplain John Forzell, tiie casket was low-
ered into the grave as the honor guard fired the traditional three
volleys and the bugler sounded taps. Later that evening, the
Rice family flew home, no doubt grateful that their loved one
had received the honor he deserved—an honor bestowed in a
fashion few Indians had ever received—and that the unpleas-
antness of the previous week-and-a-half was finally over."
NONETHELESS, the discrimination John Rice had fallen vic-
tim to after having made the ultimate sacrifice for his country
weighed heavily on Evelyn Rice in the days following his fu-
neral. Compounding her anger and grief was the realization
that Memorial Park cemetery continued to operate as it always
had—seemingly unfazed by the bad publicity it had received in
the weeks immediately following its refusal to bury Sergeant
Rice. Cemetery officials characterized the public outcry over
their burial policy as "mob hysteria," and produced a pamphlet
that sought to justify their actions. The pamphlet, titled "The
Truth about the Sergeant Rice Incident," argued that Evelyn
Rice had had ten days to review the burial contract, "which was
ample time to inform herself of its contents and restrictions." It
17. Sioux City Joumal, 9/6/1951, 9/5/1951; Washington Post, 9/5/1951; Miscel-
laneous news clippings from the Philleo Nash Papers, Truman Library.
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also presented an "expert opinion" from Canadian archaeolo-
gist Dr. R. S. McNeish that American Indians were descended
from "Wild Mongolian Nomads" who came to North America
from Asia, proving that "the American Indian is not of Cauca-
sian descent." Cemetery officials also noted that 90 percent of
private cemeteries in the Urúted States had racial restrictions,
and that the practice of limiting burial to members of the Cau-
casian race was "almost as old as the cemetery business" itself.'"
From Evelyn Rice's perspective, the cemetery's publication
and distribution of the pamphlet was the last straw. On Decem-
ber 12, 1951, she brought suit agairist Memorial Park cemetery
for its "willful and malicious" behavior (refusing to bury her hus-
band and circulating the pamphlet), which had caused her "great
mental distress, humiliation, emotional fatigue, and nervous
exhaustion." Her attorneys (Neil R. McCluen of Winnebago,
Nebraska, and Lowell Kindig and Robert Beebe of Sioux City)
argued along two separate tracks. First, they contended that
Memorial Park cemetery had humiliated Evelyn Rice and com-
mitted a breach of contract by refusing to bury her husband.
The second track was a constitutional argument centered on
the cemetery's restrictive burial clause (or restrictive covenant).
Rice's attorneys based their arguments for Memorial Park's
breach of contract on an unusual interpretation of the burial
clause. From their perspective, since Evelyn Rice was Caucasian
and the person who had signed the contract, she was the owner
of the lots and ought to be able to bury her husband in one of
them. In a secondary argument (that must have angered John
Rice's Winnebago parents and family), the attorneys argued
that since John Rice was 11/16 Wirmebago and 5/16 Caucasian,
he should have been allowed burial as he was Caucasianl Should
the court not support the breach of contract arguments. Rice's
attorneys would then focus on the constitutional issue—that the
contract itself was unconstitutional and that the cemetery's policy
of restricting burial to "members of the Caucasian race" violated
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as
Article One, sections one and six, of the Iowa Constitution.^'
18. "The Truth about the Sergeant Rice Incident."
19. Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, ¡nc, et al. 102 F. Supp 658 (U.S.
District Court for the Northem District of Iowa, Westem Division, 2/4/1952);
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Memorial Park's defense strategy was simple: cemetery
officials had negotiated hundreds of burial contracts over the
years—all with the race restrictive clause. The contract was
clearly written, and Evelyn Rice had signed it voluntarily. Even
if cemetery officials had wanted to bury John Rice, they would
have been legally obligated to obtain the permission of all living
lot owners and surviving family members of people already
buried (which was impractical), or face numerous potential
breach of contract suits that would have driven them out of
business.^"
After hearing arguments later that year, the Woodbury
County District Court dismissed the case in December 1952.^ '
Judge Ralph C. Prichard cited Memorial Park's right to "stand
upon the terms of its contract," ruling that the cemetery was not
in breach since the restrictive burial clause referred to the person
to be buried rather than the owner of the lot. Second, the court
ruled that John Rice was not Caucasian; Memorial Park officials
were within their rights, therefore, to enforce the terms of the
contract. The judge then moved to address the key constitu-
tional and civil rights questions raised in the case. Was the re-
strictive covenant a violation of Evelyn Rice's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment? Did the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bid the state of Iowa from enforcing a contract if it contained
such a covenant? If Iowa courts allowed the cemetery to enforce
the contract, were they not providing de facto recognition and
legitimacy for the cemetery's discriminatory burial clause? In the
Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. et al, 245 Iowa 147 (Supreme
Court of Iowa, 9/22/1953); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et aL,
349 U.S. 70 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1955).
20. Ibid.
21. Three days into the trial. Memorial Park's legal team requested that the
case be removed to the U.S. district court in Sioux City amid questions over
whether or not Woodbury County District Court had jurisdiction in the matter.
Two months later (on February 4, 1952), U.S. District Court Judge Henry N.
Graven sent the case back to Woodbury County. Among the reasons Judge
Graven cited in his decision to remand was that since the cemetery was pri-
vately owned, "neither the State of Iowa nor any of its agencies" had any con-
nection with the ownership or operation of the cemetery or "with the transac-
tion in question." Graven also expressed "considerable doubt" as to whether
there was an "independent claim or cause of action which presented a contro-
versy arising under the Constitution of the United States,"
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landmark Shelley v. Kraemer case (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court
had ruled that private agreements with restrictive covenants
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for state courts to enforce them. Basing their argument on
the Shelley v. Kraemer precedent, Evelyn Rice's attorneys main-
tained that if the court ruled that the burial contract was valid, it
was in fact sanctioning a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause."
Judge Prichard did not buy the argument. He insisted that
the Shelley v. Kraemer precedent did not apply to Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery. Focusing particular attention on
the meaning of "state court enforcement," the judge held that in
Shelley v. Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court had barred state
courts only from providing direct aid (by granting injunctior\s,
specific performance, and other active aids) to the enforcement
of race restrictive covenants. Issuing a court ruling in support of
a contract with a restrictive covenant, in Judge Prichard's opin-
ion, did not fall under the umbrella of providing direct aid. Rec-
ognizing that the contract between Evelyn Rice and Memorial
Park cem.etery was a private agreement, the judge declared that
the state of Iowa was simply a neutral party in the matter—cer-
tair\ly not exerting direct aid to enforce a discriminatory act."
What Evelyn Rice was requesting. Judge Prichard extrapo-
lated, was for the state to go beyond Shelley v. Kraemer to declare
void any private contract with a restrictive covenant, to alter a
contract that she voluntarily entered into with another private
party, to punish Memorial Park for enforcing the contract, and
to bar the recognition of restrictive clauses in contracts between
private parties even though no active state aid was given in their
22. Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et al, 102 F. Supp 658 (U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Western Division, 2/4/1952);
Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. et al, 245 Iowa 147 (Supreme
Court of Iowa, 9/22/1953); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et al,
349 U.S. 70 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1955).
23. If, on the other hand, Evelyn Rice had directed family or friends to lower
her husband's body into the ground in violation of her agreement, the state
would have had to deny Memorial Park assistance in restraining her, nor
could it have entertained an action for damages against her for violating the
agreement.
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enforcement. While sympathetic to Evelyn Rice's predicament
Judge Prichard was unwilling to expand the meaning and scope
(as he understood it at least) of Shelley v. Kraemer. On appeal, the
Iowa Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision issued on Sep-
tember 22, 1953, affirmed the lower court's ruling in toto, with
Justice Robert L. Larson declaring that the "moral ends" of the
plaintiff did not "justify the means she sought to obtain them."^*
Despite these legal setbacks, Evelyn Rice pressed on. In
mid-November 1954 (roughly three years after her husband's
burial) she had cause for hope when the U.S. Supreme Court
heard arguments in the case. A divided court affirmed the Iowa
Supreme Court decision but issued a writ of certiorari, indicating
that four justices were interested in exploring Iowa's willingness
to enforce the "restrictive [burial] covenant." In the opinion of
these justices, the role of Iowa state officials in the John Rice in-
cident rendered the case "special and important."^
Evelyn's hope proved short lived, however. Five months
later (on May 9, 1955), the U.S. Supreme Court (although still
divided 5-3 on the issue) dismissed the writ of certiorari it had
issued earlier, noting that it had been "improvidently granted."
According to Justice Felix Frankfurter, key to the court's opinion
was the Iowa state legislature's enactment on April 21,1953, of
"corrective legislation" that made it unlawful for any organiza-
tion (except churches, established fratemal societies, or incorpo-
rated cities, towns, or other political subdivisions of the state of
Iowa) to deny burial "solely because of the race or color of such
deceased person." In addition, the new law voided all existing
contracts or regulations that restricted burial based on race or
color, Violatior\s were punishable by a fine of 25 to 100 dollars
per occurrence. "Had the statute been properly brought to our
attention and the case thereby brought into the proper focus,"
Justice Frankfurter scolded, "the case would have assumed such
24. Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et al, 102 F. Supp 658 (U.S.
District Court for the Northem District of Iowa, Westem Division, 2/4/1952);
Rice V. Sioipc City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. et al, 245 Iowa 147 (Supreme
Court of Iowa, 9/22/1953); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et ai,
349 U.S. 70 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1955).
25. Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et al, 349 U.S. 70 (U.S. Su-
preme Court, 1955).
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an isolated significance that it would hardly have been brought
here in the first instance."^*
Dissenting from the decision to dismiss the case were Justices
Hugo Black, Earl Warren, and William O. Douglas. According to
Justice Black, serious questions arising fi^om Rice v. Sioux City
Memorial Park concerning the equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment remained undecided.
The court dismissed the case, he argued, because the Iowa legis-
lature had passed new legislation that protected every person in
Iowa except Evelyn Rice, "the one who has already filed a suit
to prosecute claims like this." The new cemetery law, he con-
tinued, "leaves everyone in Iowa free to vindicate this kind of
right except the petitioner." This obvious injustice. Black con-
cluded, "raised a new question of equal protection of the laws
equally as grave as those which prompted us to take this case
originally."^
Although the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for re-
hearing, Evelyn Rice was fed up after nearly three years of court
battles, and no additional legal efforts were mounted in her be-
half. While disappointed that both state and federal courts had
ruled against her petitions, Evelyn Rice may have drawn some
comfort from the realization that her husband's death helped
bring about the enactment of a state law that promised to pre-
vent the type of injustice and dishonor that she, her family, and
the entire Winnebago Nation had endured since August 1951.
Burial ground segregation, characterized in a 1955 Califomia
lawsuit as a "particularly stupid form of human arrogance and
26. Ibid. The bill (Senate File 71), "An Act relating to the operation of cemeteries
in the state of Iowa, and funds for the perpetual care and maintenance thereof,
and the sale of burial space therein, and providing penalties for the violation
thereof" was introduced on January 22,1953. The Senate passed it on February
16, and the House passed it on April 15. The vote was unanimous in both
chambers. 1953 Iowa Senate Journal, 69, 314; 1953 Iowa House Joumal, 1244-45.
To view the bill, see 1953 Uws of Iowa, chap. 84, 161-64 or the DocSTAR Web
site at http://docstar.Iegis.state.ia.us/dswv. Incidentally, the provision striking
down existing burial contracts with the race-restrictive covenant appears to
violate Article 1, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states
from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
27. Rice V. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., et ai, 349 U.S. 70 {U.S. Su-
preme Court, 1955); David Fellman, "Constitutional Law in 1954-1955,"
American Political Science Review 50 (1956), 93-95.
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intolerance," would no longer slight Iowa's racial minorities.^
The John Rice incident, therefore, played a role in trar\sforming
the Iowa Code into a system of laws that er\sured justice and
fair treatment for all of its citizens.
ANTI-INDIAN PREJUDICE AND RACISM in Sioux City
and throughout much of the American West had never been as
inter\se or imbedded as that directed against African Americans
in southem states with long traditions of institutionalized slav-
ery followed by legal segregation. But it existed and found ex-
pression in similar ways. Some westem state and local govem-
ments denied welfare or general assistance to Indians because
of their status as "wards" of the federal govemment. Restrictive
covenants in housing sometimes prevented Indians from living
in certain neighborhoods. Arizona and New Mexico did not al-
low Indiar\s to vote in state electioris until 1948. Prejudice was
often manifested in bans against American Indiaris purchasing
liquor or patronizing some bars and saloons and in a variety of
less formal social and economic discriminatior\s.^
Evelyn Rice noted to reporters that even before her own
marriage she had seen discrimination after her sister married
John Rice's brother. And she experienced it personally in Sioux
City, explaining that the more equal treatment the couple found
in other cities around the country where John Rice had been
stationed made her especially aware of it. Rev. Harvey Nelson,
president of Sioux City's Ministerial Association, representing
70 pastors of a number of denominations, drew attention to the
discrimination as well. In a statement issued in response to the
Sergeant Rice incident, he said, "We know that radal prejudice
is prevalent and disastrous. This situation is an example of what
absurd extremes it will take and to what lengths it will go."^
At the natiorial level, the World War II experience had proved
a springboard for civil rights movements among African Ameri-
28. Fellman, "Constitutional Law in 1954-1955," 95n (re: Long v. Mountain View
Cemetery Assoeiation [1955]).
29. Ross, "The Indian Who Never Ck)t Home," 17; Theodore Haas, "Restrictive
Covenants and the Indians," The American Indian 4 (1948), 11-15.
30. Sioux City loumal, 8/30/1951.
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cans. Native Americans, and other racial minorities. Military
service sometimes threw together people from different parts of
the country with widely divergent backgrounds and racial at-
titudes. While African Americans served in segregated units
and occasionally encountered white soldiers or civilians who
abused them, American Indians served in integrated uruts and
often foimd military life an assimilating experience. Wartime
camaraderie often overcame existing prejudices and broke
down racial barriers. Back home, the nationalism generated by
World War 11 led more Americans to become more tolerant of
ethrüc and racial minorities, and the military effort became a
cause that transcended traditional divisions. The war gave
those accorded only marginal status an opportunity to "prove"
themselves equal. Patriotism, after all, demanded that anyone
who participated in the war should receive honor and respect. '^
For a large, industrial society mobilizing to battle against
fascism and totalitarianism, it quickly became obvious that the
social complications of racism impeded the smooth prosecution
of the war. Moreover, radsm seemed outdated and simply wrong
in the broader context of a nation of diverse people unified in a
common cause. A segregated American military fighting a cru-
sade agairist fascist totalitarianism and its ideology of racial in-
equality invited comparison to the embarrassing contradiction
in America's historical treatment of its own racial minorities.
The war also provided an opportunity to link war goals of de-
fending democracy internationally to movements for expanding
democracy and civil rights at home. African Americans fought
for "Double V"—victory both abroad and at home. Minority
veterans came out of the war with the conviction that they
31. Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution,"
Joumal of American History 55 (1968), 90-91, 103-4; Neil A.Wynn, The Afro-
American and the Second World War (New York, 1975), 99; McCoy and Ruetten,
Quest and Response, 11-12; A. Russell Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II
(Santa Barbara, CA, 1977), 131; Richard M. Daifiume, Desegregation of tlie Armed
Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, MO, 1969), 132; Bernstein,
American Indians and World War II, l/^rM, 58,87,110,114; David G. McCullough,
Truman (New York, 1992), 589; Tom Holm, "Fighting a White Man's War: The
Extent and Legacy of American Indian Participation in World War 11," loumal
of Ethnic Studies 9 (1981), 74; Jere Bishop Franco, Crossing the Pond: Tlie Native
American Effort in World War II (Dentón, TX, 1999), 156-59.
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should not have to return to a status of anything less than full
inclusion and equality.^ ^
The cause of civil rights in post-World War II America was
also aided by the common belief that racial discrimination un-
dermined America's position in the Cold War. The two Cold
War superpowers competed for the support of developing na-
tions, and the vast majority of the people in those countries
were people of color. How could the United States convince
them to take its side in the Cold War when the blemishes in its
own record of civil rights for racial minorities were so obvious?
The symbiotic relationship between the federal government's
Cold War and civil rights policies became clear in the report of
Truman's 1947 Committee on Civil Rights. The report, titled "To
Secure These Rights," argued that there were three reasons civil
rights abuses required the government's attention: a moral rea-
son—discrimination was morally wrong; an economic reason—
discrimination was bad for the economy; and an international
reason—discrimination undermined U.S. foreign relations be-
cause the Soviet Union seized on reports of discrimination and
race-motivated violence to damage American credibility in the
Third World."
Dramatic episodes such as the John Rice incident, moreover,
gave the Soviets ammunition to counter American claims of So-
viet human rights abuses being committed behind the Iron Cur-
tain. In January 1951, for example, Tass, the official Soviet news
agency, described American culture as "decadent" and "de-
praved" and cited as evidence the "fact" that slavery, while
nominally abolished, actually continued to exist. Just two
months after the John Rice incident, Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Vishinski, at a session of the United Nations General
Assembly, accused the Uruted States of violating human rights
by lynching blacks and referred specifically to the killing of an
African American prisoner in Florida by the sheriff who was
guarding him. The author of an article in The Nation in the fall of
1959 summed up a key problem in American foreign policy
32. Dalfíume, "The 'Forgotten Years' of the Negro Revolution," 93-97; Bu-
chanan, Black Americans in World War II, 113-15.
33. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American De-
mocracy (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 79-82.
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with the assessment that "Jim Crow at home seems to have
bankrupted our diplomatic resources" abroad.^
Whether the Soviet Union used the John Rice incident for
propaganda is unknown, but it certainly could have.^ ^ David
Sänger, chair of the Iowa branch of the NAACP, described the
Rice matter as a "slap in the face for our statesmen who are try-
ing to sell democracy to the world. Can you picture the grin on
Stalin's face," Sänger lamented, "as he read the headlines in the
American newspapers?" Nebraska Govemor Val Peterson ech-
oed such concerns. "You couldn't manufacture better ammurù-
tion for the commurüsts if you sat up all night and tried," Peter-
son declared shortly after the John Rice incident. "It is hard to
imderstand how some Americans want to be Stalin's unwitting
assistants. "^ ^
The Truman administration was certainly sensitive to the ef-
fect that episodes of racial discrimination had on America's po-
sition in the Cold War. According to historian Mary L. Dudziak,
President Truman repeatedly emphasized the importance of
civil rights for U.S. foreign policy, and he promoted "human
rights with the goal of preserving world peace." If America was
to be victorious in its crucial battle against the Soviet Union for
global influence, Truman argued in Pebruary 1948, the United
States had to "correct the remaining imperfectior\s in [its] practice
of democracy."^' By responding as he did to the Sergeant Rice
incident, Truman may have been trying to "correct a remaining
imperfection" so as to disarm (or at least blunt) an embarrassing
Soviet propaganda weapon—one aimed at capitalizing on the
scandalous treatment accorded an American war hero who had
given his life fighting for democracy and freedom and against
the expansion of communist tyraimy in South Korea.
34. Charles Allan Baretski, "Cabbages or Artichokes," School and Society,
12/8/1951, 353-57; William A. Rutherford, "Jim Crow: A Problem in Diplo-
macy," The Nation, 11/8/1951,428-29.
35. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Soviets did indeed make use of the
John Rice incident. At a reading of an earlier version of this paper at a history
conference in 1998, a gentleman in the audience commented that he had heard
about the John Rice matter while stationed in West Berlin. He stated that the
East Berlin radio station was making much ado about the story!
36. Sioux City Journal, 8/30/1951; Hewitt, "The Indian Who Never Got Home," 18.
37. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 82,87.
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PRESIDENT TRUMAN was, in fact, an urüikely advocate in
the cause of civil rights. He had grown up in a time and in a part
of Missouri where racism and social prejudice were imbedded
in local white culture, and he never outgrew the racial biases of
his youth. But, guided by his sense of nationalism, he did move
toward a more egalitarian position throughout his life. By the
time he entered politics in the 1920s, he had developed a strong
belief in the U.S. Constitution as a solid anchor, a source and
protector of liberties and freedoms. In a 1940 local campaign
speech that was surprisingly bold for the time and place, he ex-
pressed belief in "the brotherhood of all men before the law,"
arguing that "if any class or race can be permanently set apart
from, or pushed down below the rest in political and civil rights,
so may any other class or race." The federal government, ac-
cording to Truman, had the responsibility to guarantee equal
treatment before the law, equality of opportunity, and civil
rights for all Americans.^ *
Truman's own military experience contributed to changes in
his racial attitudes. A veteran of World War I, he appreciated the
sacrifice that each soldier and sailor had made in defense of the
U.S. Constitution. During World War II and the few years there-
after, newspapers carried stories on vigilante enforcement of
traditional racial codes. Thugs attacked minority soldiers sta-
tioned in southern states and sometimes even went after minor-
ity veterans returning from the war. In 1946 Truman learned
that the Ku Klux Klan had stepped up its level of violence, with
minority soldiers as occasional victims. Truman was appalled
cmd pursued prosecution whenever possible.^ ^
The evolution of Truman's views on race and civil rights par-
alleled that of other liberal Americans in the post-World War n
era. Increasingly they saw civil rights as both a moral and a le-
gal imperative. But that change in thinking far outpaced the av-
erage American voter. In acting, Truman took a sizable political
38. Harry S. Truman, "Statement by the President," Public Papers of Harry
Trutnan, 414; McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, vii; Alonzo L. Hamby,
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973),
61, 65; Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Mora! Courage and
Political Risks (Carbondale, IL, 2002), 6.
39. Gardner, Harry Truman and Ciml Rights, 6; McCuUough, Truman, 589.
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risk. He rated low in public opinion polls, and Americans over-
whelmingly opposed dvil rights legislation. No groundswell of
support from a popular civil rights movement helped him as it
would later presidents. He created the President's Committee on
Civil Rights in 1946 based on little more than persor\al conviction.
Several times he tried to push legislation through Congress to
implement the committee's recommendations, but he was lim-
ited by political realities. In most cases he backed off his initia-
tives in the face of southem opposition within his own party."
In civil rights for African Americans, Truman's actions con-
formed generally with the goals of the emerging civil rights
movement; in Indian policy, however, Truman inadvertently
joined ranks with a movement that was trying to reverse the
"Indian New Deal" of Frar\klin Roosevelt. Roosevelt had ap-
pointed to key policy-making positions people who were com-
mitted to a radically new vision of Indians and their place in
America. His commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier,
pushed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) through Congress
in 1934. Congress gave Collier only a portion of what he wanted,
but he worked tirelessly to end longstanding federal efforts to
forcibly assimilate Indians, end their special status as "wards"
of the federal government, and move toward a policy based on
cultural pluralism—an acceptance of Indian sovereignty, a revi-
talization of tribalism, a reconstitution of Indian self-government,
and a preservation of Indian cultures where desired.*'
Collier may have crippled forced assimilation, but he had
not killed it. Opponents challenged Collier's Indian New Deal
almost from the start. Cultural pluralism, apparently, had never
established deep roots. The last real champion of the IRA in the
House, Edgar Howard (D-NE), was defeated for reelection in
1934. Few supporters remained in Congress by the 1940s, and
40. McCullough, Truman, 588; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal. 188-69, 214, 232-
33,243, 291; Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 12-15.
41. See Lawrence C. Kelly, The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and tJw Ori-
gins of Indian Policy Reform (Albuquerque, NM, 1983); Kenneth R. Philp, John
Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 2920-1954 (Tucson, AZ, 1977); Graham D.
Taylor, The New Deal and American ¡ndiart Tribalism: The Administration of the
Indian Reorganization Act. 1934-1945 (Lincoln, NE, 1980); and Lawrence C.
Kelly, "The Indian Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality," Pacific
Historical Review 44 (1975), 291-99.
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criticism of the Indian New Deal from within and outside of
Congress forced Collier into a defensive posture by the World
War II years. Uncertainty about the Indian New Deal and a con-
sensus for reducing the government's role in Indian affairs was
growing. Even former IRA supporters such as Oliver LaFarge,
head of the influential, mostly white, Indian affairs advocacy
group, the Association on Indian Affairs, had grown frustrated
with the failure of the IRA to reduce the control exercised by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) over Indians and favored Col-
lier's plan for federal withdrawal.*^
Indian opinion was mixed as well. World War 11 nationalism
had created an atmosphere in which most Americans (even some
Indians) thought that assimilation in some form was inevitable.
Many Indian veterans of Sergeant Rice's generation had grown
accustomed to the more equal treatment and status they had
enjoyed in the military and sought the removal of any barriers
to full individual rights under U.S. citizenship, such as bans on
alcohol sales in some areas. But while most Indians wanted to
retain tribal rights and group identity, most non-Indians did not
include those traditions in what they viewed as a reward for In-
dian participation in war."
Collier's opponents came from both parties, but they were
all conservative critics of Roosevelt's New Deal from westem
states. Some from both parties had ties to non-Indian economic
interests who saw individualistic assimilation as the best means
to gain access to resources on Indian lands unavailable to them
under restricted trust status. In the late 1930s and 1940s, critics
introduced bills to repeal the IRA, to strip the BIA of authority
to manage tribal funds, to remove trust restrictions on allot-
ments, and to allow states to extend their penal laws over reser-
vations. They did not yet have the votes for any draniatic policy
reversal, but they eventually succeeded in stalling the ¿idian
New Deal by cutting its funding levels, blocking any further
legislation, and insisting that the BIA begin to plan for federal
withdrawal from Indian affairs."
42. Bernstein, American Indians and World War 11,110,164,170.
43. Ibid., 133,136-41.
44. John S. Painter, "Congressional Conservatism and Federal Indian Policy,
1928-1950" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of
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In respor\se. Collier came up with a long-term plan to get
the government out of Indian affairs. But his version of assimi-
lation included assimilating Indians as tribes rather than as in-
dividuals in order to protect tribal autonomy and self-govern-
ment. His plan called for rehabilitating reservations at federal
expense and gradually transferring the government's role to
tribal councils. The BIA generated specific rehabilitation plans
for several reservations, but they collected dust. Congress was
unwilling to spend the necessary money, and the plans lan-
guished without support. The beleaguered commissioner fi-
nally resigned in frustration in 1945, but he remained confident
that what he had left behind would survive the difficult politi-
cal climate and represent a lasting legacy.*^
Collier's assimilationist opponents believed that Indian
sovereignty could not coexist with American sovereignty and
that individual rights based on U.S. citizenship should displace
tribal rights based on membership in any Indian group. They
looked condescendingly at American Indian cultures as "mu-
seum pieces" and criticized Collier and the IRA for taking Indi-
ans "back to the blanket."*"
Through the 1930s and 1940s, assimilatiorusts added their
voices to the conservative critique of New Deal liberalism, defi-
cit spending, and the explosion of federal bureaucracies. Con-
servative assimilatiorusts favored a libertarian economic indi-
vidualism and opposed government regulation of the economy
and most spending on social programs. They portrayed the BIA
as another unnecessary government bureaucracy, arguing that
Indian trust land restrictior\s and tribal economic development
American Historians, Detroit, Michigan, 4/2/1981), 3,10-15; Frederick J. Stefon,
"The Irony of Termination: 1943-1958," The Indian Historian 11 (1978), 4-5;
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violated the free marketplace based on individual property
rights and private enterprise. The postwar economic boom,
recent technological innovation, and the explosion in the con-
sumer culture all encouraged a common assumption that every-
one wanted to live like modem, white Americans. A few went
so far as to combine an intense anticommunism with their op-
position to the New Deal, and to compare Indian communal
traditions and the bureaucracy of govemment programs on res-
ervations to communist totalitarianism.*^
What emerged was a "liberation" view of federal Indian pol-
icy. Paternalistic govemment programs of sending bureaucrats
to reservations to teach and enforce assimilation had failed.
Only a sink-or-swim approach to integrating Indians as indi-
viduals rather than as tribes would succeed. Terminationist later
became the label for this position because advocates wanted to
terminate tribal status. They called for an end to the reservation
system and a withdrawal of the government's role in Indian
affairs by eliminating the IRA, the BIA, and separate tribal sov-
ereignty. Indians needed to be freed from govemment paternal-
ism and from the restrictions of separate Indian culture and
status, terminatiorusts argued, because these things only pre-
vented American Indians from integrating into American life
and competing as individuals in an open economy and society."
The departure of the small group of committed cultural plu-
ralists within the Department of the Interior signaled a funda-
mental shift in the administration of Indian Affairs. The admini-
stration's newcomers favored Collier's plan for federal with-
drawal, but they were less forceful in promoting the cultural
preservation and separate tribal sovereignty dimensiorxs of the
Indian New Deal.*'
47. Ibid.
48. [bid. For a summary of the "liberation" view of Indian policy, see O. K.
Armstrong, "Set the American Indian Free," Reader's Digest, August 1945, 47-
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The 1946 off-term elections swept Republicans into control
of Congress for the first time since 1930, and put assimilationists
into their strongest position since the Indian New Deal. But the
congressional terminationists failed to coordinate their piecemeal
actions into a coherent movement. The Department of the Interior
and some congressional Democrats opposed most individual
tribal termination bills in committee actions, arguing that the
tribes under consideration were not ready. With one exception,
bills that got beyond committee action in the Eightieth Congress
were minor, local matters that did little to affect overall policy.™
One reason for the terminationists' initial failure was that
Indian affairs had become a low priority in national politics.
Few members of congress, moreover, knew much about Indians
or what they wanted. Tribes no longer presented military threats,
and the nation had become a superpower with a global foreign
policy and the world's leading economy. Congressional leader-
ship had difficulty finding members of congress who were will-
ing to serve on or chair the low-presbge, low-reward committees
that dealt with Indian affairs. Indians had not yet developed
their own organizations to effectively lobby politicians or public
opinion." '^ All this meant that considerations outside of Indian
communities influenced politicians more than Indian voices in
creating policy and that a small group of determined people
could engineer major change in federal policy. John Collier had
demonstrated that, and terminationists soon would do the same.
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Report," Review of General Semantics 4 (1948), 161-67; idem, "Indian Self-
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The orJy major piece of legislation affecting Indian policy in
1946 was one that all sides agreed upon. The Indian Claims Com-
mission Act (ICC) created a special court to hear cases by tribes
against the govemment for inadequate compensation in land
settlements or failure to properly administer trust lands. Previ-
ously, each group first had to go through the cumbersome proc-
ess of obtaining special enabling legislation from Congress to
sue the govemment. Some supported the ICC for reasons of jus-
tice, efficiency, or the many worthwhile things that settlement
money could do on reservations desperately in need of eco-
nomic development. Terminationists, however, saw it as a final
settlement between old antagorusts so that no controversies
over past dealings with Indians would linger after tribes were
terminated. Truman worried about the cost of the ICC process.
The inflationary economy of the postwar years created strong
pressure to reduce federal expenditures. The conservative Eight-
ieth Congress twice came close to overriding presidential vetoes
of tax reduction bills and would not accept any spending in-
creases. But when Wyoming Democratic Representative Joseph
O'Mahoney, chair of the House Committee on Interior and In-
sular Affairs, convinced Truman that the claims bill would re-
duce BIA expenditures over the long term, Truman backed the
measure and ensured its passage."
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The elimination of budgetary concerns allowed President
Truman to support the Indian Claims Commission bill based on
his growing sense of justice and advancing civil rights. The di-
vide in the E)emocratic Party on civil rights, however, muted the
issue even after the Democrats regained control of Congress in
the 1948 election. In Indian affairs. Democrats promoted no al-
temative to termination, but their leadership of key congres-
sional committees kept tribal termination bills from getting be-
yond committee action.
When Republicans reclaimed control of both the White
House and the Congress in the 1952 election, termina tionists
again attempted to forge ahead with their agenda. Through the
early 1960s, Congress passed 14 bills terminating 109 tribes. The
terminationists' success was more limited than the numbers
suggest, though. Many Indians did not want termination, and
most of the terminated tribes were small, representing only 3
percent of the Indian population and 3.2 percent of land in trust.
In some cases, the Indians involved were largely assimilated
and favored the change. For most others. Congress later restored
their tribal status.^ ^
As Indians around the country united and developed the
means to make their voices heard, liberals, some moderates,
and a few conservatives in Congress came to support a more
Indian-defined type of self-determination on reservations. Some
congressmen, such as Democratic Senator Frank Church of
Idaho, continued to promote termination into the mid-1960s.
But most came to see that civil rights for Indians should in-
clude consideration of tribal rights as well as individual U.S.
citizenship rights. Although Indians would certainly not win
everything they wanted from Congress, the stage was set for
the federal policies of self-determination in President John F.
Kennedy's New Frontier and President Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society.'^
53. Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Biggs, "The Evolution of the Termination
Policy," American Indian Law Review 5 (1977), 148-51.
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Federal Indian Policy in the Kennedy and ¡ohnson Administrations, 1961-1969 (Al-
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President Truinan did not live long enough to see the out-
come of his well-intentioned but contradictory Indian policies.
He had not sided with terminationists in Congress, largely be-
cause of opposition from Indians or the Department of the Interior.
Neither was he aware of the policy void caused by inattention
and confusion that would allow better organized terminationists
to shape Indian policy. He had acted on behalf of individual
civil rights for Indians and the rights of particular tribes. Like
many Americar\s, he saw no distinction between the two.^ ^
Truman's Committee on Civil Rights recognized the history
of Indian self-government and addressed the issue of tribal
rights in its deliberations. However, in its final report. To Secure
These Rights, the only mention of particular Indian rights in-
volved violations of U.S. citizenship rights, as when Arizona
and New Mexico denied Indiaris the right to vote. Even those
examples were included in a long list of violations experienced
by many minority groups.^ *
Terminationists used some of the same rhetoric as the civil
rights movement—terms such as emancipation, freedom, and lib-
eration. To further confuse matters, Truman shared much of the
terminationists' disdain for the BIA. Although "the Government
created Indian bureaus for the alleged protection of Indian
rights," he wrote, "every one of our Indian bureaus in Washing-
ton was saddled with crooks and cheats." But the reasons for
his anti-BIA sentiments were different than those of termina-
tionists. Instead of seeing the bureau as an obstacle to Indians
mixing and competing with the mainstream, he saw it as a big
part of the historic violation of Indian rights.^'
In Where the Buck Stops, Truman devoted a seven-page chap-
ter to Indians. All but the last two paragraphs decried the his-
toric mistreatment of Indians. As an avid reader of history, he
was knowledgeable about Indian history and showed sjnnpa-
55. In another example of Truman defending tribal rights, the president nixed
a bill for Alaska statehood because of Indian opposition to provisions concern-
ing native possessory claims. See Philp, Termination Revisited, 46-49.
56. Robert K. Carr, executive secretary, memo to members of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights, 6/6/1947, Committee Documents, folder; Indians,
Civil Rights of, Truman Papers.
57. Harry S. Truman, Wfiere the Buck Stops: The Personal and Private Writings of
Harry S, Truman (New York, 1989), 285.
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thy for wrongs committed against tribes as well as individual
Indians. But he did not address his own policies, except that he
"tried to look after Indian rights all the time I was president."
For evidence, he offered a couple of instances when he vetoed
bills that he felt exploited Indians. Although he was willing to
use the power of the federal govemment to champion civil
rights, he never understood Indian status sufficiently to con-
ceive that his own policies needed to go beyond just defending
certain tribes when Congress tried to perpetrate an injustice and
beyond occasional moves in defense of individual Indian rights,
such as those of Sergeant '^
THE RICE CONTROVERSY that so vividly resembled the
broader civil rights movement's struggle to break down segrega-
tion also underscored the uncertainties of Indian status and iden-
tity in postwar American life. John Rice, sharing in the national-
ism of the era, took great pride in being an American soldier. He
had never rejected his Indian identity, but neither did he embrace
it in the way many Indians later did during and after the Red
Power and self-determination movements of the 1960s and 1970s.
Despite the paradox of Truman's Indian civil rights policies,
Winnebagoes appreciated Truman's role in the John Rice inci-
dent. At the 119th Armual Winnebago Powwow in July 1985,
Frank LaMere, executive director of the Nebraska Inter-Tribal
Development Corporation, honored the memory of President
Truman and the Wmnebago veterans of the Korean War. A month
later, Winnebago artist Charles Raymond HI (a cousin of John
Rice), along with 20 other tribal members, traveled to Indepen-
dence, Missouri, to take part in a ceremony at the Truman Presi-
dential Library, where they presented a drawing depicting Ser-
geant Rice with President Truman in the background. "President
Truman's action demonstrated another part of his greatness," one
participant commented. "We Indians of every tribe take pride in
what Truman did. He represented all the Indian people."^'
58. Ibid., 281-88.
59. Tribute given by Frank LaMere at the 119th Annual Winnebago Powwow
in Winnebago, Nebraska, 7/28/1985, vertical file, Truman Papers; Truman
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In August 1985 Winnebago artist Charles Raymond III
presented this drawing to the Harry S. Truman Presi-
dential Library in Independence, Missouri. Tfie picture,
a collage of images dealing zoith the "John Rice Incident,"
includes a portrait of Sergeant Rice centered between
his two unit patches, a soldier nmrching in front of the
Tomb of the Unknoxvn Soldier, President Truman giv-
ing the order to inter Rice's body at Arlington, various
newspaper headlines showing the nation's outrage, a
mounted Winnebago warrior riding into a beam of
light, and an eagle^ther resting atop a folded Ameri-
can flag. Courtesy of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska.
The John Rice incident also helped the people of Sioux City
to confront the less savory aspects of its past. Over time resi-
dents became more accepting of racial and ethnic diversity. On
the fiftieth anniversary of the incident, the VSTmnebago tribe and
Sioiix City worked together on a public memorial. Several hun-
dred people gathered at Veteran's Park in Sioux City to hear
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Mayor Marty Dougherty and Winnebago Tribal Council Chair-
man John Blackhawk honor John Rice. Part of the ceremony
was traditional as well. Tribal representatives placed a colored
blanket around Evelyn Rice as she stood at the drumming circle
that closed the ceremony. Indian activist Frank LaMere had
been invited but could not attend. Instead, he sent a message
read at the ceremony in which he said, "We have come far at the
experte of Sergeant John Rice and the Gold Star family he left
behind. Our respect for one another this day is their legacy and
speaks to the possibilities. The bridges we can build tomorrow
will be strong if we do not forget that the foundation was laid
on a battlefield in Korea."™
In 2004 the Winnebago Tribal Council received a letter from
87-year-old Edward Krischel—the army bugler assigned to John
Rice's burial detail. He had remained with the detail, serving as
honor guard all the way to Arlington National Cemetery. After
the Arlington funeral, Evelyn Rice gave him the American flag
she had received during the Sioux City burial. Honored, ICrischel
kept the flag for the next 50 years. The purpose of his 2004 letter
was to inquire if the tribe or the local American Legion post
would like to have the flag. At the July 2004 Winnebago Pow-
wow, Evelyn Rice and her children, along with relatives, friends,
and veterans, acknowledged the retum of the flag, which was
brought out by the American Legion post as the Hard River
Singers rendered an honor song. The Winnebago tribe always
regarded Sergeant John Rice as a hero, and that honor was also
extended to his wife. Six months later, Evelyn Rice died in Sioux
City. She had been so scarred by the burial experience that she
had refused to talk about it thereafter, even to her children. Ac-
cording to Winnebago Tribe Vice Chairman Jim Snow, she "never
wanted to be in the spotlight, but her integrity and love for the
memory of her husband sustained her." '^
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